including historians of religion, if generally unacknowledged by them. 6 These historians essentially consider that once the historical evidence is all in, it will speak for itself.
The new scientific study of religion is often associated with, and certainly is exemplified by, the work of von Ranke's near contemporary, Max Müller (1823-1900). His edited translations of the Sacred Books of the East, continued after his death, made a large number of primary sources from Asian traditions available for the first time to Western scholars. 7 His critical approach to these texts, and that of his contemporaries, was comparative and historical, modeled on the scientific philology of the time. However, the new Religionswissenschaft soon took a decidedly anti-empirical, even anti-scientific, turn. 8 Increasingly, historians of religion rejected scientific studies of religion as positivistic and reductionist and turned, rather, to various inflections of Verstehen, an approach to historiography, associated with the work of Max Weber that seeks an empathetic understanding of historical subjects rather than treating them as empirical data. 9 Influenced by German romanticism and ignoring Weber's own commitment and his major contributions to historiography, historians such as J. G. Droysen, W. Dilthey, and R. G. Collingwood came to embrace verständnisvoll hermeneutical methods. Subsequently, historians of religion abandoned historical methods altogether and the study of religion became associated with an ahistorical approach in which "history of religions" became a synonym for assembling a phenomenological corpus of truncated and decontextualized cultural data, the temporality of which was disregarded in favor of claims to their being manifestations of a sui generis sacrality, e.g., by members of the "history of religions" school associated with the influential work of Mircea Eliade, especially during the 1960s and 1970. This "humanistic" turn, then, allowed for a return of theological, or crypto-theological, agendas, however furtive, to the study of religion, a return, as it were, to its early nineteenth century pre-scientific predisposition.
A subsequent postmodernist vogue in religious studies revived a kind of pseudo-historicism that emphasized the socio-historical construction of cultural particulars. Despite its abstruse pseudo-philosophical façade, however, the postmodernist emphasis on cultural relativism is simply a naïve reminiscence of the constructionist views of nineteenth-century his- 6 Ibid. toricism. 10 However, their historicist views neglect the historicity of primary sources and are informed, rather, by an anti-theory, anti-science ideology that provided legitimation for many in the academy to pursue religious interests in the academic study of religion.
Given this somewhat desultory view of the history of religions, what might the future hold for such study? I maintain at the outset that the history of religions must regain its core defining characteristic as history.
Historiographical cognition
Historiographical thinking seems to be an aspiration of all human beings. 11 This ordinary mnemonic proclivity for producing our history is, in the conclusion of historian Sam Wineburg, simply "our psychological condition at rest, a way of thinking that requires little effort and [that] comes quite naturally". 12 The mind of Everyman, in other words, seems to be characterized by historiographical cognition, whether that history has an actual or a mythical quality.
According to the title of Giles Fauconnier's and Mark Turner's study of conceptual blending, 13 Everyman thinks with narratives. The literary scholar Jonathan Gottschall argues that this human facility for narrative is an evolutionary-based strategy that allows for an imaginative exploration of complex 10 As with Postmodernism, Georg Iggers notes that eighteenth-century German historicism was a reaction against Enlightenment thought, and like Postmodernism, it views, in Iggers' summary, "all social reality as a historical stream where no two instances are comparable and which assumes that the value standards and logical categories, too, are totally immersed in the stream of history" (G. social relationships while avoiding the ambiguities of social realities.
14 While narrative might well be foremost in the way we think, it is not the only way -I have previously written about "lists" for example, a genre of genealogical relationships that dominates the earliest written materials.
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Initially, historical and comparative studies of religion are often understood as historical genealogies that were neither narrated nor listed but modeled with the diagram of a family tree. This tree-model was borrowed, of course, from the philological models of Indo-European languages from which the study of religion emerged and which it emulated. Thus the Austrian linguist and ethnographer Wilhelm Schmidt argued for a history of religions rooted in an Urmonotheismus that, over time, branched into the plurality of religious alternatives. 16 The dominant understanding of early Christianity still employs such a model, whereby the historical diversities of Christianity are commonly represented as branching from a tree rooted in the founding actions and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, which studied religion as a socio-cultural phenomenon that evolved with human culture, modeled their history as a kind of inverted tree, tracing religion from the plurality of primitive polytheism to a triumph of ethical monotheism.
The tree model of historical change and relationships is, of course, based on a view of singular origination as presented in the Genesis story, which dominated Western views of history until the nineteenth century and which assesses historical change with reference to mythological origins. 17 When, however, this mythological tree was felled by the halberd of nineteenth-century science, little consensus remained about how to understand the plurality of non-Christian, as well as Christian, religious evidence that is dispersed over time and throughout space. Fundamentally, the problem faced by historians of religion, as by all historians, is that their evidence is not only diverse but it is fragmentary. 18 Thus, no matter how many new discoveries are made and "thick descriptions" assembled, a von Rankean account of "how things really were" will always remain elusive; the historical reality is that all the data is never in, nor will it ever be. The problem is not the discovery or gathering of more data but how to make sense of the data at hand.
A simplistic analogy for this historiographical problem is the children's game of connect the dots. In this game, children are presented with dots on a piece of paper, which, like the diverse fragments of historical evidence, are seemingly unrelated. Unlike the historical evidence, however, the dots in the children's game are numbered, allowing the children to connect them in a way that represents some image that is replicable to anyone playing that same game. So, for example, in one familiar exemplar game, connecting five dots that are numbered in diagonal opposition produces the image of a star; this same star is infinitely replicable as long as the dots are connected in the given numerical sequence. Were this an example of a historical problem, a solution would be suggested that involved a network of reciprocal relations.
Since historical evidential dots are unnumbered, however, they may be connected in alternative ways. Thus, the evidential dots of our example may be connected contiguously to form a pentagram; were this an example of a historical problem, the same data would suggest a relationship of data defined by their mutual occupation of a common space. Given the same evidence, in other words, a set of unnumbered dots, this solution while entirely plausible is nevertheless diametrically opposed to the former. Although the numbers of possible connections are constrained by the evidential dots, unnumbered dots may nevertheless be connected arbitrarily to produce various nonsensical diagrams -a solution that has characterized far too much historiography. It is, in other words, the historians' task to reconstruct a historical event by connecting the dots of their fragmentary evidence in the most plausible way. Plausible reconstructions of historical occurrences not only depend upon a critical evaluation of evidence but, as von Ranke already emphasized, upon a theoretical commitment by historians that supports the probable historiographical reconstruction of the relationships allowed by that evidence.
Historiographical theory
If historical thinking is an ordinary process of human cognition, then academic historiographical thinking is a specialized and professionalized version of this ordinary process that corrects -or should correct -the "common sense" biases of the ordinary thinking.
19 It should do so, it would seem by replacing "common sense" with reflective theoretical stances. The British historian Neville Morley notes that advocates of theory in historical work "insist that un-or undertheorised historical accounts are inadequate, because they depend on a set of implicit and problematic assumptions masquerading a 'common sense'". 20 On the other hand, the more positivistic historians, who question the use of theory, "maintain that any account of … [the past] using modern concepts and theories is illegitimate and misleading, as the evidence has been corrupted and distorted with ana chronism".
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Over the years, historians have proposed a number of theoretical models for "connecting-the-dots" of their historical data and, thereby, "fill-in-the gaps" of the historical record, which have, indeed, proven to be anachronistic. These include such approaches as the dynamics of dialectical materialism, formal rational choice theory, the role of social networks, dynamic population models, social epidemiology, 22 most of which have been found to reflect contemporary views and values imposed on historical agents.
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Since the 1990s, however, some historians have begun to reconsider the biocognitive universals of Homo sapiens that have been established by evolutionary theory as a frame for historiography. 24 Even as Darwin's evolutionary theory represented a historicization of biology, a number of historians, including historians of religion, became intrigued with the idea of employing evolutionary theory for explaining historical change and development already with the publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species (1859). For example, in 1882, the comparative anatomist Alexander Macalister presented an evolutionary history of the Christian church to the in- augural meeting of the Dublin Presbyterian Association. 25 The address seemed to have been well received since Macalister notes in his Preface that it was printed at the request of "some of those who heard it", although he does acknowledge that others "seem to have thought that [his] line of thought tended to the depreciation" of their religion 26 -an ambiguity about scientific approaches to the study of religion that continues to the present day.
Perhaps the most audacious historiographical proposal based on evolutionary theory to date is the recent programmatic agenda of Harvard historian Daniel Lord Smail. In his groundbreaking work On Deep History and the Brain, 27 Smail proposes a history of Homo sapiens beginning with the African origins of the species ca. 80,000 BC which focuses on our evolved biocognitive substrate. For Smail, this history would trace the development of, changes in, effects of, and relationships between various practices and behaviors that have violated, manipulated, or modulated our evolved neurochemical systems within various environmental and historical contexts.
However, few historians have actually produced comprehensive studies that employ an evolutionary frame. A notable exception is the Canadian historian Gregory Hanlon who has written a mentalités-type history of the Tuscan village of Montefollonico in the seventeenth century. 28 Hanlon organizes and interprets the results of his detailed archival evidence in terms of Darwinian evolutionary themes of governance, cooperation, competition, reproduction and exchange. Citing the Belgian philosopher of science Robert Franck, Hanlon notes that the theoretical constraints of evolutionary theory -"the larger context" for proximate contextual causes -"sets the limits of what can and cannot occur or endure beyond the short term". 29 And, the evolutionary biologist Peter Turchin employs evolutionary theory as a frame for his comprehensive study of 
Cognitive historiography
Historians, like cognitive scientists, are concerned with human minds. As concisely formulated by the American historian of ancient history Chester Starr: if one is to understand "any era of the past, one must be able to penetrate into the minds of its inhabitants". 36 Similarly, the German sociologist and philosopher of history Georg Simmel contended that " [m] ind is the material of history. … If history is not a mere puppet show, then it must be the history of mental processes. … [T]hose matters which come first in the rational order of things -the cognitive functions of the mind -come last from the standpoint of our awareness and our observation". 37 Cognitive scientists, like evolutionary psychologists, now agree that the morphology of the human brain and the functions of that morphology have changed little, if at all, over the past 100,000 years, well outside the constraints for the 80,000 year deep history proposed by Smail. Since these scientists also agree that mind is constrained by brain, the minds of "modern and historical people are sufficiently similar in general cognitive function to warrant a meaningful comparison" 38 -and the cognitive sciences are increasing our knowledge about modern minds exponentially.
Few historians of religion, however, have acknowledged the challenge of cognitive historiography suggested by Starr and Simmel -despite the argument made already in 1994, by Thomas Lawson, himself a historian of religion and one of the founders of the field of cognitive science of religion, that history, like any human production, is a product of the human minds which require cognitive explanation. 39 Although some scholars have made pioneering studies in this area, they have all been limited to considerations of specific historical problems. And while some of these studies have in concert addressed the history of a specific religious tradition -particularly Graeco-Roman religions 40 -no one has yet produced a sustained historical study framed by cognitive theory comparable to those of Hanson and Turchin framed by evolutionary theory -a historiographical poverty that leaves many historians of religion still doubting the value of evolutionary and cognitive theorizing for their study of religion. 41 This absence of a sustained cognitive history of any religious tradition is unfortunate, for the cognitive sciences can provide empirically and experimentally tested theoretical models which can allow historians to connect the dots of their data with a greater level of confidence than has previously been the case, 42 for example Thomas Lawson's and Robert McCauley's ritual competence and ritual form hypotheses, 43 Dan Sperber's cognitive attraction theory of cultural stabilization and transmission, 44 Harvey Whitehouse's ritual modes theory of religious transmission 45 and Roy D'Andrade's cognitively framed "cultural schemas" 46 have all been productively employed to connect the dots of historiographical evidence in the study of religion.
In addition, the evolutionary and cognitive defaults identified by cognitive scientists include a number of developmentally early behavioral practices and mental figurations frequently associated with either scholarly or with "folk" understandings of "religion" and can offer explanations for their existence and historical perseverance. These include, for example, the detection of agency in the environment, which provides an evolutionary advantage for any organism since it alerts that organism to possible predatory threat. However, our capacity to identify agency in the environment often results in false positives based on partial or faulty sensory input, i.e., an identification of agency where none exists. Secondly, experimental evidence has shown that we have a developmentally early "theory of mind" or disposition for an "intentional stance", that is, for viewing the behavior of others in terms of their assumed mental properties. 47 This intentionality, appropriately associated with other agents with whom we must interact in our environment, can also become associated with false positives, resulting in an imagined agent-causality for events in the environment, e.g., for creation. Unreflective perceptions of agent-causality, whether actual or imaginary, evoke similar responses and motivate similar behaviors. Understanding these responses and behaviors can help historians to explain otherwise puzzling human beliefs, ideologies and actions. One markedly recurring human action is ritual. Evolutionary psychologists and social anthropologists have shown that ritualized behavior is a universally common practice whereby an environment is organized. 48 Religious rituals are but an institutionally structured subset of this ordinary behavior. So disenchanted, these behaviors become more accessible to scientific as to historical understanding.
The theoretical object of a cognitive history of religion would not be a Heilsgeschichte of the gods and their divine entourages and chosen peoples, nor one of presumed cultural manifestations of "the sacred". Rather, the theoretical object of a cognitive history of religions would be that of the recruitment and exploitation of those default evolutionary and cognitive biases by those institutions, ideologies, and practices that have deemed "religious" at some point or other in human history. Already in 1909, the Cambridge classicist Jane Harrison proposed a research program that anticipated, within the frame of Darwinian theory, such a cognitive history of religion. Citing Darwin's expectations for the future of psychology, Harrison proposed an evolutionary history of religion that would focus on "the necessary acquirement of each mental capacity [for specific religious practices and ideas] by gradation". 49 Her proposal for understanding religion as a suite of evolved behavioral features presciently articulates the agenda of contemporary evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists. According to these scientists, the behaviors and mental representations identified by evolutionary and cognitive theorists -such as biases for agent causality, teleology, sociality, the fundaments of morality -are, because of the common evolutionary history of Homo sapiens, transcultural and transhistorical characteristics of Homo sapiens and of their behaviors. Such panhuman proclivities should, consequently, be of central concern to historians -to the extent, of course, that we get the science right. (We must recognize that inquiries into the complexity of human minds and their functions are, after all, still new areas of scientific investigation.) Although shaped by historical antecedents, cultural contexts and the cognitive capacities of historical subjects, explanations for historical events and change cannot, of course, ever be reconstructed with certainty from among the range of possibilities these sets of variables allow. This is not only because of the complexity of these variables and the number of their possible relationships, but also because much history is a consequence of accident. As Nobel Prize recipient Daniel Kahneman rightly contends, "[t]he idea that large historical events are determined by luck is profoundly shocking, although it is demonstrably true". 50 Nevertheless, knowledge of antecedents, contexts and cognition allows for a retrodictive reconstruction of historical events and change with some approximate degree of accuracy. An understanding of cognitive, in addition to material, constraints may, however, well temper Kahneman's surprise about the seemingly accidental character of historical change. That is to say, historical data, including those of the history of religions, are produced and transmitted -at least in principle -in historically, contextually, and cognitively tractable ways. Nevertheless, few of the historians of religion who have employed cognitive approaches to specific historical problems have addressed what is potentially their most significant contribution, namely, the problem of historical change. 51 Those who have, have largely employed the literary implications of conceptual blending for understanding textual transmissions, for example, Ted Slingerland's work on the fourth-century BC Chinese text of Mencius, 52 and Hugo Lundhaug's analyses of early gnostic texts. 53 In addition to employing cognitive insights and models in their historiographical work, historians of religion can productively participate in the cognitive project generally, by assessing the "real-life" validity of cognitive models. After all, if behavioral and cognitive defaults identified by evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists are, in fact, panhuman proclivities, then their effects should be readily documented from what is known from the entire deep history of Homo sapiens.
Conclusion
James Laidlaw, who describes himself as social anthropologist who is "well-disposed" towards the cognitive sciences, 54 has acknowledged that developments in cognitive science have real consequences for social anthropology in general and the study of religion in particular. Nevertheless, he cautions his colleagues that these consequences should not be "exaggerated" with an expectation that interpretation will be superseded or encompassed by scientific methods. 55 This same emphasis on the compatibility of interpretation and explanation was emphasized already by Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley, the founders of the field of cognitive science. 56 Similarly, as I have emphasized elsewhere, I, in no way, mean to suggest that cognitive historicizing can or should replace traditional historical methods. 57 Nevertheless, a cognitive historiography, including a cognitive historiography of religion, can draw upon well-founded theory that can supplement and provide correctives to traditional historiographical tools. It can do so by identifying and explaining data that have been produced by ordinary processes of human cognition but that have otherwise been neglected in favor of more explicit forms of evidence that historians have, for one reason or another, come to privilege -principally texts, which are themselves, of course, constrained products of human minds to be explained rather than unembellished reservoirs of historical facts. Cognitive theories can contribute insights into how and why some representations of historical behaviors emerged, were favored and remembered, but not others that may have been historically, culturally or cognitively possible or present. They also offer explanations for how and why some representations but not others have been exploited by religious institutions as efficient ways by which elaborated and complex information, such as theologically elaborated codes of morality and religious ideologies, have been legitimated and successfully transmitted over time.
Perhaps those historians of religion currently engaged in framing their historical work with evolutionary and cognitive theorizing might collaborate with other academic historians to move towards the scientific historiography promised at the end of the nineteenth century. Two recent developments would seem to support this promise. The first promise of note is the establishment of a full-time faculty position in the cognitive science of religion in the Religious Studies Department at California State University, Northridge. 58 The second is an "expertise" in history of religions advertised by the School of History and Anthropology, Queen's University, Belfast. 59 The School of History and Anthropology at Queen's University is, of course, the administrative home of the Institute of Cognition and Culture.
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Epilogue: The Future of the Past Whereas theoretical and experimental work in the cognitive sciences is necessary for cognitive theorizing, a cognitive historiography is perhaps the most promising way for actually realizing a scientific study of religion. And the initial works on specific historical problems that employ such a cognitive historiography, which I have cited above, supports that promise in that they go beyond theoretical constructions and laboratory experimentations to engage in actual cognitive history of religions research and explanation.
However, this promise for a scientific study of religion is compromised by what Robert McCauley identifies as the fragility of the modern scientific enterprise generally. 61 Scientific inquiry has been independently pursued throughout human history, in fifth and fourth century BC Greece, for example, in China from the first century BC until the fifteenth century AD, and in Arabic-Islamic civilization until the thirteenth century. 62 These pursuits all floundered, however, because of a failure of social and political will to provide the material conditions and intellectual commitment necessary to sustain such inquiry. Have conditions changed with modern Western scientific pursuits? Given the historical trajectory of scientific achievement over the past 150 years, one might be optimistic about the future of the scientific enterprise. Given a deeper historical perspective, however, one is more wary. And, in face of the fragility of the scientific enterprise, there is, of course, the "natural" appeal of religion. 63 The naturalness of this appeal is based on the cognitively optimal and mentally attractive defaults of Homo sapiens that have been exploited by religious institutions but which tend to persist even among scientists and intellectuals, including among scholars of religions themselves.
Historical predictions, whether positive or negative, like any attempt to predict future trends, tend to "regress to the mean" -to adapt to historical change a counterintuitive model from statistics. 64 That is to say, what are presently perceived either as historical innovations or stagnations tend over time to revert to a central tendency or probable expectation. And, as Donald Wiebe has fastidiously documented, the 150 year history of the academic study of religion is characterized by a pervasive and perduring mean of religiosity. 65 As Kahneman warns, all "nonregressive predictions will be found to be biased" towards a current situation, based as they are on overly confident causal intuitions. 66 For example, the advertised position in cognitive science of religion at California State University, Northridge, mentioned above as an optimistic harbinger for the future for a scientific study of religion, nevertheless stipulates that the successful applicant must, among other responsibilities, "be able to develop curricula dealing with Neurotheology". 67 Accordingly, Wiebe and I have agreed in our Budapest "confession" that it is unlikely that a scientific study of religion will ever be established as an academic field -as opposed to an innovative but restricted area of specialized research. 68 This assessment, we maintain, is neither pessimistic, as some colleagues have judged it to be, nor, obviously, is it optimistic. Rather, we maintain, on historical and scientific grounds, that it is a realistic assessment -that the future of the study of religion will inevitably differ little from that of its past.
